Publications
Controlling for Oversight in Studies of Oversight (with Benjamin Kinnard and John W. Patty), Legislative Studies Quarterly
Bargaining for Longevity, Journal of Politics
Persuasion in Veto Bargaining (with Kyungmin Kim and Richard Van Weelden), American Journal of Political Science, 2025
Controlling for Oversight in Studies of Oversight (with Benjamin Kinnard and John W. Patty), Legislative Studies Quarterly
Bargaining for Longevity, Journal of Politics
Persuasion in Veto Bargaining (with Kyungmin Kim and Richard Van Weelden), American Journal of Political Science, 2025
Working Papers
Coordination in Bureaucratic Policymaking (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Under Review
Abstract. Many public policies rely on multiple agencies, raising the question of how agencies with overlapping policy responsibilities coordinate their decisions. We consider a model of coordination in which a political executive can provide subsidized coordination between two agencies and consider how this possibility affects both the agencies' incentives and, ultimately, social welfare. Our model of subsidizing coordination is very simple: an executive can invest her own resources in a coordination protocol that the agencies can (but need not) use to align their decisions. We consider the impact of scarce attention at the agency level and demonstrate that, while coordination between the agencies is maximized by the agencies having aligned policy preferences, the fact that the executive can invest in the coordination protocol undermines these incentives.
Regulatory under Uncertainty (Job Market Paper)
Under Review
Abstract. I present a model of policymaking in complex domains. I apply the model to a hypothetical situation in which a firm's product has uncertain social impacts. The firm can acquire more information about this, but knows that this information will be "public" in the sense that it will also be observed by the regulator. The firm's choice about information is represented as a Blackwell experiment. After the result of the experiment is realized, the firm and regulator can each take a unilateral costly action to reveal the information with certainty. I show that the firm-optimal can be achieved by providing a binary experiment that is informative only about whether the firm or the regulator has an incentive to take a costly action. I further extend the model to allow the firm and regulator to bargain prior to the game and allow the firm to have private information about the product.
Under Review
Abstract. I present a model of policymaking in complex domains. I apply the model to a hypothetical situation in which a firm's product has uncertain social impacts. The firm can acquire more information about this, but knows that this information will be "public" in the sense that it will also be observed by the regulator. The firm's choice about information is represented as a Blackwell experiment. After the result of the experiment is realized, the firm and regulator can each take a unilateral costly action to reveal the information with certainty. I show that the firm-optimal can be achieved by providing a binary experiment that is informative only about whether the firm or the regulator has an incentive to take a costly action. I further extend the model to allow the firm and regulator to bargain prior to the game and allow the firm to have private information about the product.
The Boundaries of Persuasion (with Sangmin Lee)
Abstract. Policy experiments, which provide voters with information about a policy's effectiveness, are often implemented selectively. I propose a theoretical framework that explores the role of strategically designed policy experiments in shaping voter polarization. In the model, a politician seeking to maximize voter support tailors the informativeness of experiments based on her confidence in the policy's effectiveness and the predispositions of different voter groups. I show that this endogenous selection of experimental design intensifies polarization in districts with moderate initial polarization, but conversely reduces polarization in districts that were previously deeply divided. The model further examines the impact of asymmetric group sizes and incomplete voter attention.
Abstract. Policy experiments, which provide voters with information about a policy's effectiveness, are often implemented selectively. I propose a theoretical framework that explores the role of strategically designed policy experiments in shaping voter polarization. In the model, a politician seeking to maximize voter support tailors the informativeness of experiments based on her confidence in the policy's effectiveness and the predispositions of different voter groups. I show that this endogenous selection of experimental design intensifies polarization in districts with moderate initial polarization, but conversely reduces polarization in districts that were previously deeply divided. The model further examines the impact of asymmetric group sizes and incomplete voter attention.
The Politics of Alarm (with Lauren Futter)
Abstract. Many bureaucrats in the US government are tasked with warning of economic crises and natural disasters. Yet, unlike politicians and high-visibility agency heads subject to media pressure or elections, bureaucrats often lack external incentives to report. What induces bureaucrats to report risks accurately and when might they choose not to? How might principals incentivize socially optimal levels of reporting? We develop a formal model of disaster reporting in which an agency receives signals about whether a disaster will occur. The environment from which the agency gathers information may be of high or low quality, influencing its ability to correctly identify a potential disaster. Given the information the agency receives, it can choose to report or hide this signal from a principal who may then take action based on that report. When the principal’s actions do not match the true state of the world, the agency faces reputational costs. For this reason, the agency faces a conflict between truthful reporting and preserving its reputation for future crises. We find that an agency will only truthfully reports when the signal it receives is moderately accurate. Otherwise, it will be inclined to withhold information when it is first received or in a future period.
Abstract. Many bureaucrats in the US government are tasked with warning of economic crises and natural disasters. Yet, unlike politicians and high-visibility agency heads subject to media pressure or elections, bureaucrats often lack external incentives to report. What induces bureaucrats to report risks accurately and when might they choose not to? How might principals incentivize socially optimal levels of reporting? We develop a formal model of disaster reporting in which an agency receives signals about whether a disaster will occur. The environment from which the agency gathers information may be of high or low quality, influencing its ability to correctly identify a potential disaster. Given the information the agency receives, it can choose to report or hide this signal from a principal who may then take action based on that report. When the principal’s actions do not match the true state of the world, the agency faces reputational costs. For this reason, the agency faces a conflict between truthful reporting and preserving its reputation for future crises. We find that an agency will only truthfully reports when the signal it receives is moderately accurate. Otherwise, it will be inclined to withhold information when it is first received or in a future period.
A Theory of 'The Loop' (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.
Works in Progress
Lobbying with Externalities (with Kyungmin Kim and Richard Van Weelden)
Populism in Social Media (with Jiwon Kim and Anthony DeMattee)
Rhetorical Pivoting in Campaigns (with Sangmin Lee and Chamseul Yu)