Publications
Bargaining for Longevity, Accepted, Journal of Politics
Persuasion in Veto Bargaining (with Kyungmin Kim and Richard Van Weelden), American Journal of Political Science, 2025
Working Papers
Controlling for Oversight in Studies of Oversight (with Benjamin Kinnard and John W. Patty)
Revise and Resubmit, Legislative Studies Quarterly
Abstract. In honor of the creation of the Congressional Oversight Research Database (CORD), we explore some of the selection effects that the data in this resource may be subject to. We present two simple, related principal-agent models and discuss how they offer different comparative statics, with a focus on the occurrence of oversight of the agent by the principal. Within these models, we also explore the issue of timing of oversight, which raises classic political economy questions, such as credibility of commitments, dynamic consistency, and the origins of accountability. We then discuss various forms of selection effects that may affect empirical studies of congressional oversight and empirically test the effect of policy disagreement on oversight using the data contained in CORD, drawing implications about our models for the study of congressional oversight.
Coordination in Bureaucratic Policymaking (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Under Review
Abstract. Many public policies rely on multiple agencies, raising the question of how agencies with overlapping policy responsibilities coordinate their decisions. We consider a model of coordination in which a political executive can provide subsidized coordination between two agencies and consider how this possibility affects both the agencies' incentives and, ultimately, social welfare. Our model of subsidizing coordination is very simple: an executive can invest her own resources in a coordination protocol that the agencies can (but need not) use to align their decisions. We consider the impact of scarce attention at the agency level and demonstrate that, while coordination between the agencies is maximized by the agencies having aligned policy preferences, the fact that the executive can invest in the coordination protocol undermines these incentives.
Under Review
Abstract. Many public policies rely on multiple agencies, raising the question of how agencies with overlapping policy responsibilities coordinate their decisions. We consider a model of coordination in which a political executive can provide subsidized coordination between two agencies and consider how this possibility affects both the agencies' incentives and, ultimately, social welfare. Our model of subsidizing coordination is very simple: an executive can invest her own resources in a coordination protocol that the agencies can (but need not) use to align their decisions. We consider the impact of scarce attention at the agency level and demonstrate that, while coordination between the agencies is maximized by the agencies having aligned policy preferences, the fact that the executive can invest in the coordination protocol undermines these incentives.
Strategic Experiments under Regulatory Uncertainty (Job Market Paper)
Abstract. I present a model of policymaking in complex domains. I apply the model to a hypothetical situation in which a firm's product has uncertain social impacts. The firm can acquire more information about this, but knows that this information will be "public" in the sense that it will also be observed by the regulator. The firm's choice about information is represented as a Blackwell experiment. After the result of the experiment is realized, the firm and regulator can each take a unilateral costly action to reveal the information with certainty. I show that the firm-optimal can be achieved by providing a binary experiment that is informative only about whether the firm or the regulator has an incentive to take a costly action. I further extend the model to allow the firm and regulator to bargain prior to the game and allow the firm to have private information about the product.
Abstract. I present a model of policymaking in complex domains. I apply the model to a hypothetical situation in which a firm's product has uncertain social impacts. The firm can acquire more information about this, but knows that this information will be "public" in the sense that it will also be observed by the regulator. The firm's choice about information is represented as a Blackwell experiment. After the result of the experiment is realized, the firm and regulator can each take a unilateral costly action to reveal the information with certainty. I show that the firm-optimal can be achieved by providing a binary experiment that is informative only about whether the firm or the regulator has an incentive to take a costly action. I further extend the model to allow the firm and regulator to bargain prior to the game and allow the firm to have private information about the product.
Polarization through Persuasion
Abstract. Policy experiments, which provide voters with information about a policy's effectiveness, are often implemented selectively. I propose a theoretical framework that explores the role of strategically designed policy experiments in shaping voter polarization. In the model, a politician seeking to maximize voter support tailors the informativeness of experiments based on her confidence in the policy's effectiveness and the predispositions of different voter groups. I show that this endogenous selection of experimental design intensifies polarization in districts with moderate initial polarization, but conversely reduces polarization in districts that were previously deeply divided. The model further examines the impact of asymmetric group sizes and incomplete voter attention.
Abstract. Policy experiments, which provide voters with information about a policy's effectiveness, are often implemented selectively. I propose a theoretical framework that explores the role of strategically designed policy experiments in shaping voter polarization. In the model, a politician seeking to maximize voter support tailors the informativeness of experiments based on her confidence in the policy's effectiveness and the predispositions of different voter groups. I show that this endogenous selection of experimental design intensifies polarization in districts with moderate initial polarization, but conversely reduces polarization in districts that were previously deeply divided. The model further examines the impact of asymmetric group sizes and incomplete voter attention.
A Theory of 'The Loop' (with John W. Patty) [pdf]
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.
Abstract. We describe a model of strategic, decentralized and asynchronous communication in policy-making networks. Two central focuses of the model are the actors' awareness of who other actors will talk to in the future and the sequential ordering of actors' communications. We derive conditions for truthful "cheap-talk" communication within sequential communication networks and show that (1) the ordering of individuals within the network can matter above and beyond individuals' policy preferences and degree of decision-making authority, (2) sequential communication throughout can engender credible communication in situations in which private, dyadic communication will not, and (3) sequential communication can sometimes undermine credible communication, so that exclusion of one or more "extreme" (or extremely powerful) individuals from the communication network can be (Pareto) optimal. Finally, the analysis and results suggest that it is theoretically impossible to cleanly hive off homophily from the study of strategic information transmission in networks.
Works in Progress
The Politics of Alarm (with Lauren Futter)
Populism in Social Media (with Jiwon Kim and Anthony DeMattee)
Rhetorical Pivoting in Campaigns (with Sangmin Lee and Chamseul Yu)